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Abstract. A partial password is a mode of password-based authentica-
tion that is widely used, especially in the financial sector. It is based on
a challenge-response protocol, where at each login attempt, a challenge
requesting characters from randomly selected positions of a pre-shared
secret is presented to the user. This mode could be seen as a “cheap
way” of preventing for example a malware or a keylogger installed on a
user’s device to learn the full password in a single step. Despite of the
widespread adoption of this mechanism, especially by many UK banks,
there is limited material in the open literature. Questions like how the
security of the scheme varies with the sampling method employed to form
the challenges or what are the existing server-side implementations are
left unaddressed. In this paper, we study questions like how the security
of this mechanism varies in relation to the number of challenge-response
pairs available to an attacker under di↵erent ways of generating chal-
lenges. In addition, we discuss possible server-side implementations as
(uno cially) listed in di↵erent online forums by information security ex-
perts. To the best of our knowledge there is no formal academic literature
in this direction and one of the aims of this paper is to motivate other
researchers to study this topic.
Keywords: authentication, passwords, partial passwords, server-side implemen-
tation, recording attacks, dictionary attacks, keyloggers
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1 Introduction
The design of a secure and e cient user authentication scheme is one of the major
concerns for most enterprises and organizations. A significant amount of money,
time and e↵ort are invested every year to carry out research in this direction. Ac-
cording to Cybersecurity Ventures, the U.S Government has invested more than
$50 million over the past four years in Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) tech-
niques, aiming to improve a simple password-based authentication scheme [7].
Additionally, many academic studies in the past studied extensively the security
and usability of password-based authentication techniques [1,3,9,13,14].
Despite the fact that several methods of authentication, such as hardware to-
kens, biometrics, mouse and keyboard keystroke analytics, have been developed
in the past few years, a simple password-based scheme is still the primary mean
of authentication for many online services. This is mainly due to the fact that
password-based authentication is a cheap, e cient and secure (at least in the-
ory) method of authenticating users. As shown in [1], designing other than simple
password-based authentication scheme might be a very complex task mostly due
to the fact that not only the best security engineering practices, e.g., usability
and privacy have to be applied, but also the human factor has to be taken into
consideration.
The security of password-based systems relies on the user to choose a strong
enough password. If this password is not complex enough, then brute-force or
dictionary attacks could potentially breach the security of a system [3]. Brute-
force attacks assume that the distribution of human-chosen passwords is uniform
which is not a practical assumption, as human tend to select passwords based
on patterns or structures arising from their natural language. Relatively recent
research has revealed that this curve (of user-selected passwords) is skewed and
more sound mathematical metrics for the security against guessing attacks using
large dictionaries are presented in [4,5].
In addition to the above-mentioned human factor, more sophisticated attacks
using, e.g., malware could be performed. These types of attacks predominantly
exploit various phishing campaigns convincing either directly or by other means
like social engineering approaches the potential victim to unintentionally install
malicious software on the target computing device. Upon infection, the victim’s
machine is completely controlled by the attacker who can easily obtain user’s
passwords in a singe step.
Researchers have realized this problem, therefore other identification methods
in an attempt to mitigate single-step disclosure of shared-secret by introducing
time-varying challenges have been proposed [14,11]. The partial password scheme
is an example of such method where authentication takes place in the form
of challenge-response pairs, with the challenge requesting a set of characters
chosen randomly from a pre-shared password. It is considered as a very cheap
and e↵ective method against several attacks that could otherwise compromise a
shared-secret in a single step. It is claimed to be more secure than the simple
password implementation due to the fact that the size of the responses’ space
grows in a combinatorial way, depending on the implementation. For example,
for a password of length n and a partial-password implementation requesting m
characters out of n, the number of possible responses is
 n
m
 
if no repetitions are
allowed and nm if repetitions are allowed.
Partial password method is widely deployed in the Banking Sector espe-
cially in UK as a part of (at least) 2-factor authentication method [2,16] for
authenticating users in Internet Banking. It decreases the probability of suc-
cess of malware-based attacks since the fraudster cannot really provide to their
Command-and-Control (CC) server the full password in a single step. Even
though, the fraudsters can sometimes bypass this mechanism by exploiting the
weakest link, the human, using HTML injections to modify the page presented
to the user and request the full password, this scenario is out of the scope of this
paper.
In general, all type of attacks applied to the simple password implemen-
tations, apply also to partial-password implementation schemes. The only dif-
ference is that the attacker requires more data to launch a successful attack,
i.e., intersepting more times the authentication handshake in order to either re-
construct the full password or get enough data to respond correctly to a new
challenge with an overwhelming probability. Thus, we have three main type of
attacks applied also to partial-password implementations, as follows:
1. Brute Force: An attacker uses a computer program or a script that pro-
duces all possible password combinations using a fixed alphabet. Then, the
attacker tries each password, one by one, until authentication is successful.
2. Dictionary Attack: An attacker uses a program or script to try to authen-
ticate by cycling through combinations of common words or using dictionar-
ies based on information related to passwords obtained from compromised
servers.
3. Key Logger: An attacker uses a program to track all of a user’s keystrokes.
Outline of Contributions: Our motivation is to investigate some open ques-
tions [2], such as how security of the partial password scheme varies if challenges
are generated using a di↵erent method, e.g., allowing the same positions to be
requested in the same challenge and how information about user’s responses only
could be used to speed-up dictionary attacks. The later scenario is close to the
scenario of a hardware-keylogger or to a scenario where the malware has limited
capabilities in terms of intercepting also the challenge presented to the end-user.
Considering the fact that half of online users access their banking account at
least twice a week [12], there is su cient information exposed that could be
used to launch succes↵ul attacks.
In addition, we discuss possible server-side partial password implementations
as (uno cially) indicated by several information security experts in di↵erent
online forums [15,17]. Unfortunately, there is no formal academic literature in
this direction and we aim to motivate other researchers to work in this direction,
as partial password implementations are deployed by several major banks in their
Internet Banking [2].
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 related studies are discussed.
Section 3 presents the partial password implementations. Section 4 discusses the
security of partial password implementations under di↵erent attack scenarios
and settings. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and gives future research
directions in the field.
2 Related Studies
In this section we present related studies that fall into partial password mode of
authentication. For example, we describe hardware keyloggers attack scenarios
in which an attacker has data related to the responses but nothing related to
the associated challenges.
Hardware Keyloggers: A paper by Goring et al. [8] studies the case of a
hardware keylogger attack, where the attacker can obtain responses but not
challenges. However, their method is limited to a very particular case where
whenever authentication fails, the server presents again the same challenge to
the user. This potentially allows the attacker to construct challenge-response
pairs by just repeating the authentication process. In this paper, we further
investigate this attack model and we study how we can use data obtained in a
keylogger setting combined with large-dictionaries of user-selected passwords in
order to speed up dictionary attacks.
Partial Password Schemes: Another paper by Aspinall et al. [2] studies the
security of a particular partial password implementation, where the positions
requested in the challenges are chosen uniformly at random without replace-
ment. Furthermore, they study how the security of the system is related to
the number of challenge-response pairs that the attacker has obtained (defined
in [2] as recording attacks). In order to speed-up their attacks they applied fre-
quency analysis of letters of user-selected passwords, as appearing in the Rock-
You dataset [6]. In this paper, we study a more generic scheme in which the
challenges are chosen uniformly at random and repetitions of positions is al-
lowed. This is claimed to be a more complex scenario and left as future work in
[2] and this is the major contribution of this paper.
3 Partial Password Implementation
3.1 Protocol Description
A partial password is a challenge on a subset of characters from a full password.
The overall protocol consist of two phases which could be described as follows [2]:
A. Registration Phase: The user selects a password p = p0p1...pL of a
desired length and usually on a restricted alphabet.
B. Login Phase: The authentication phase is based on the following challenge-
response protocol.
1. Challenge: The server selects a subset of m integers i1, i2, ..., im from the
set {0, 1, 2, .., L} and presents the challenge (i1, i2, ..., im) to the user.
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
User Password p a s s w o r d
Challenge 2 5 8
Response a w d
2. Response: The response will be of the form (a1, a2, ..., am). The user passes
this step only if aj = pij for all 1  j  m.
If the user’s response is not correct, then either the same or a fresh challenge is
presented, while on a subsequent login trial a fresh challenge is generated in case
of a previous successful authentication. The scenario where the same challenge
is presented to the user was studied in [8].
In addition, Aspinall and Just studied the security of the scheme when the
integers i1, i2, ..., im are chosen uniformly at random but without replacement
[2], while the scenario of repetitions allowed is left as open question as it is
considered more complex. One of the major contributions of this paper is that
we study also this scenario.
3.2 Server-side Implementations
In classical password implementations only the hash of the password is enough to
be stored on the server. Finding a message for a given hash value (or two di↵erent
messages with the same hash value) for secure cryptographic hash functions
is considered computationally hard, thus even an adversary with unrestricted
access to the hash values cannot deduce the password from the hashes, if a
secure cryptographic hash functions is employed, such as SHA-256.
However, in partial password schemes, a new level of complexity in both
storage and validation of the shared-secret on the server side is introduced.
It is not enough anymore to store the hash of the full password and hence
standard password hashing schemes do not apply. Instead one has to either
store the password in a plaintext, or the hashes of di↵erent combinations of each
password [15,17]. For the latter solution, it is not trivial to store the hashes of
all the combinations of variable length passwords. Possibly, this is the reason
why most banks are restricting both the length and the alphabet of the user
passwords and only request for up to 4 (maximum) di↵erent characters in their
partial-password implementation schemes [2].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal academic literature discussing
the problem of server-side implementation of partial password authentication
mechanisms. We would like to motivate academic research in this direction as
those schemes are widely deployed by major banks around the globe. Based
on our research findings by searching several online security related forums we
have indicated that possible implementations deployed in industry might be as
follows [15,17]:
1. The password is stored in plaintext [15]. This imposes a significant risk from
a security point of view as an administrator is likely to have a direct access to
the password in plaintext form. Furthermore, if the database is compromised
then an adversary has access to all plaintext passwords. This solution might
be also not complied with policies requiring hashed or encrypted password
storage.
2. The hashes of all possible combinations of letters are stored per password per
user [15,17]. In a general case, where there are not many constraints applied
on a password, this solution might lead to significant database issues in terms
of required storage space. However survey conducted in [2] showed that many
banking online systems, that are based on the partial password mode of
authentication, impose more or less rigorous restrictions on the length of the
password and the size of a character set. In extreme cases password could be
restricted to a size of only four characters allowing a character set of size 10
(PIN case [2]). By applying such restrictions, database storage issues become
less demanding and thus this extensive hashing method is more applicable
in practice. Under this setting, for a password of length n and a partial
password scheme that requests m positions we need to store
✓
n
m
◆
possible
hashes, which is translated to l⇥
✓
n
m
◆
bits of information per user, if a l-bit
hash function is employed, e.g., l=256 for SHA-256.
Another practical implementation that one can think of is the following:
3. The password could be stored on the server in an encrypted form with a use
of some symmetric-key scheme, like AES. In this case, to mitigate any prac-
tical key management issues, keys could be managed by a tamper-resistant
hardware, i.e., Hardware Security Module (HSM) or a separate authenti-
cation server with employed appropriate access control systems in order to
avoid unauthorized users to access the cryptographic key. This would pro-
vide a black-box interface for encryption and substring verification such that
when the password characters are passed to the application they are fed into
the HSM or the authentication server along with the encrypted password.
The HSM could then decrypt the password and confirm (or reject) the va-
lidity of the provided characters. However, the drawback of this method is
that during authentication, the full password is decrypted and under certain
circumstances leakage of this fully decrypted password could occur.
Considering the survey conducted in [2], there are surprisingly many tight
constraints imposed on passwords used in partial password schemes, i.e., the size
of acceptable alphabet and length of the password are relatively small, as well
as the number of requested characters in the challenges. In the case of Internet
Banking authentication, most banks request a password within a given range and
restricted to a given alphabet, usually the alphanumeric of size 36 or numeric of
size 10 characters (PIN).
4 Security Analysis
In this section we focus on questions like how many challenge-response pairs are
su cient to reconstruct the shared-secret and how many are needed in order to
guess correctly the next challenge in a partial password protocol with su ciently
high probability.
We essentially study the following three attack scenarios:
– Recording Attacks: Amalware or a keylogger installed on the user’s device
is recording several (challenge,response) pairs which are sent to the fraud-
ster’s server. The main goal of the fraudster is to reconstruct the password.
– Next-Challenge Attacks: Same setting as in recording attacks but in this
scenario the attacker would like to know the success rate of providing the
correct response given some pairs.
– Attacks With Unknown Challenges: The attacker runs a dictionary
attack and for some reason has only a set of responses, without necessarily
knowing the corresponding positions. The idea is to examine if such limited
information could benefit a lot a dictionary attack. Since human-selected
password distribution is known to be skewed [4,5] this could be seen as
another confirmation of this empirical result.
In order to tackle the scenario where the positions in the challenge could
repeat in the same challenge, we resemble the definition of a multiset (cf. Defi-
nition 1).
Definition 1. A multiset is a 2-tuple (A,m) where A is some set and
m : A! N a function from A to the set N.
The number of multisets of cardinality k, with elements taken from a finite set
of cardinality n, is called the multiset coe cient. This number is denoted by
 n
k
 
and is given by
 n+k 1
k
 
.
4.1 Recording Attacks
Suppose that the user has agreed on a password P = p0...pL of length L + 1
with pi 2 A, 81  i  L, where A the pre-defined alphabet. We have evaluated
the security of partial password implementation in two di↵erent scenarios.
1. Scenario A (Without Replacement): The challenge is of the form
(i1, i2, ..., im) with 0  ij  L, for all 1  j  m and ik0 6= ik for all
1  k0, k  m.
2. Scenario B (With Replacement): The challenge is of the form
(i1, i2, ..., im) with 0  ij  L, for all 1  j  m.
Consider the case where malware, installed on the user computing device,
is capturing the responses of the user before the HTTP POST being encrypted
with SSL and sends these responses to the Command-and-Control server. Then,
the threat scenario is that after su cient data the attacker would be able either
to reconstruct the full password or have a su ciently high probability to response
correctly to fresh challenges. The security analysis of both scenarios is based on
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let X the number of di↵erent positions of the password that the
malware posses after capturing k challenge-response pairs. The probability
pk(X = i), that the malware knows exactly i out of the total L + 1 positions
is given by Equation 1 and 2 for Scenario A and B respectively,
pk(X = i) =
8>><>>:
1
(nm)
Pm
j=0
  i j
m j
  n (i j)
j
 
pk 1(X = i  j) m  i  n, k   1
1 i = k = 0
0 otherwise
(1)
pk(X = i) =
8>><>>:
1
( nm)
Pm
j=0
⇣  i
m j
 ⌘  n (i j)
j
 
pk 1(X = i  j) 1  i  n, k   1
1 i = k = 0
0 otherwise
(2)
Proof. If at step k   1, the malware obtained i  j distinct indices and the aim
is exactly i by having another pair, this implies we need to select exactly j from
the n  (i  j) unseen ones and select the rest m  j depending on the scenario.
For scenario A, we choose m   j out of the already known i   j indices, while
for B we choose m  j from i indices, allowing repetitions.
Figure 1 presents how probability varies against the number of challenge-
response pairs. As we observe, in case of L + 1 = 8 and m = 3, an attacker
can reconstruct the password with probability higher that 70% after recording
7 pairs in Scenario A and 11 for Scenario B. For L+1 = 12 and m = 3, 14 pairs
are needed in Scenario A while 17 for Scenario B for a success probability 75%.
4.2 Next-Challenge Attack
Another question of significant interest is the probability to respond correctly to
a new challenge given k pairs. Denote these probabilities as pAk+1 and p
B
k+1 for
Scenario A and B respectively. Then, we have the following:
pAk+1(i) =
  i
m
  n
m
  , pBk+1(i) =   im   n
m
  . (3)
After k runs, if the attacker knows i positions, the expected number of pairs
learned is given by EAk and E
B
k respectively,
EAk =
nX
i=m
pk(X = i) · pAk+1(i), EBk =
nX
i=1
pk(X = i) · pBk+1(i). (4)
In Figure 2 we observe that an attacker has probability higher than 75%
to correctly reply to the next challenge, by having 8 pairs in Scenario A or
equivalently 9 pairs in Scenario B, for L + 1 = 10 and m = 3. Thus, security
of both schemes is similar for average passwords regarding guessing the next
challenge.
4.3 Attacks With Unknown Challenges
In this section, we study the scenario where an attacker has obtained some
information regarding user’s responses, but has no knowledge to which challenge
they correspond. This is similar to the hardware keyloggers scenario as mentioned
by Goring et al in [8]. We call this scenario as the “attacks with unknown
challenges” scenario.
We have experimentally demonstrated that in case of a dictionary attack if
information available from keyloggers is used, then we have a significant reduc-
tion in the dictionary size, ending up with a reduced number of candidates. This
confirms even more the claim that the probability distribution of human-selected
passwords is skewed [4,5]. This is due to the fact that even with having a set
of characters randomly selected from a word, we can limit down tremendously
the number of possible candidates in a dictionary attack. In our experiments, we
used as a dictionary the well-studied RockYou dataset and results are presented
in Table 1.
Denoting by SP the set of available characters corresponding to a target pass-
word P (i.e., for P = ”password” SP = {p, a, s, w, o, r, d}), we have performed
the following three experiments:
1. Experiment A: SP and two characters’ positions of the password are
known.
2. Experiment B: SP and the length of the password are known
3. Experiment C: SP , the length of the password and two characters’ posi-
tions are known.
The algorithm we employed to filter down possible password candidates is
described in Algorithm 2. Note that R is a parameter which is used in order to
search for passwords which are close to the length of password x up to a desired
margin. In our case we study the scenario R = 1, i.e targeting passwords of
known length. Table 1 presents some of the results of our experiments.
Algorithm 1 Dictionary-Filter(SP ,dictionary D, L+ 1,R)
1: Initialize an empty list LD
2: for each x Œ D do
3: Compute Sx, the set of distinct character appearing in the word x
4: Compute A = SP \ Sx
5: Experiment A:
6: if SP ⇢ A and (xi, xj) = (Pi, Pj) known:
7: x! LD
8: Experiment B:
9: if SP ⇢ A and |x| = R.(L+ 1):
10: x! LD
11: Experiment C:
12: if SP ⇢ A and |x| = R.(L+ 1) and (xi, xj) = (Pi, Pj) :
13: x! LD
14: end for
Password Sx R Experiment A Experiment B Experiment C
password {a, d, o, p, r, s, w} 1.0 2456 36 12
baseball {a, b, e, l, s} 1.0 1435 39 1
dragon {a, d, g, n, o, r} 1.0 3378 29 3
admin {a, d, i,m, n} 1.0 3695 17 7
querty {e, q, rt, u, y} 1.0 381 4 1
Table 1. The number of possible password candidates.
From Table 1 we can observe that by knowing the set of distinct characters
we can speed up the dictionary attack tremendously. This is expected to happen
since humans tend to select words from their natural language and thus the
distribution of possible n-grams follow a certain distribution. In our future work
we plan to study how the number of possible candidates varies with R, i.e., the
attacker posses a fraction of the password’s characters. This would be complex
to implement and study.
5 Conclusion
Partial passwords is a mode of authentication which is widely deployed by the
industry and especially in UK banking sector [2]. It was proposed as a counter-
measure against attacks that could reveal a shared secret in a single step [14,11].
It is a challenge-response protocol, where the challenge is of the form, “What
are the characters of your password at positions 1,5 and 9 ?”.
In this paper, we extend the work of Aspinall et al. [2], and study some of
the open questions stated in the same paper. We investigate and compare the
security of several partial password implementations in which the elements in the
challenges are generated uniformly at random but without replacement against
the one where the replacements are allowed. The latter cases seems to be more
secure, especially for attackers aiming to fully reconstruct the password. They
also benefit from simpler implementation since we don’t need to check if the
next positions in the challenge were already asked.
Finally, we study the scenario where the attacker has access to responses but
not challenges and whether this information is valuable to dictionary-type at-
tacks. We have experimentally demonstrated that such information can tremen-
dously reduce the number of potential password candidates from a given dic-
tionary and this confirms again the claim that the probability distribution of
human-chosen secrets is skewed [4,5].
Further Work: There are several areas that we would like to investigate in
more details. We would like to extend the hardware keylogger attack to other
scenarios like having a percentage, p, of characters from the password, how this
p a↵ects the number of possible candidates from the dictionary. In addition,
we plan to explore the usability of partial passwords which is still not studied
despite the wide practical adoption of such mechanisms [10].
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